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Abstract
There is an extensive literature on modelling
cascading effects in Critical Infrastructures (CIs).
Concerning the cascading impacts of a cyber-attack
upon other CIs, a detailed scenario analysis done by
the Norwegian Directorate of Civil Protection
concludes that a considerable impact could be
achieved. However, the analysis admits that the
probability of the attack would be very low, since it
would require considerable expertise and resources.
We argue that a smart attacker could exploit existing
knowledge on cascading impacts to plan for
perfidiously-timed cyber-attacks requiring low
resources that would achieve a significant disruption
of CIs. To illustrate our point, we build and simulate a
highly-aggregated system dynamics model using
estimates of disruptions effects across CIs taken from
the literature.

1. Introduction
Critical Infrastructures (CIs) are resources that are
essential for the performance of society, including its
economy and its security, here understood as safety of
citizens and security of society’s assets. Different
countries might have slightly different definitions of
CIs. However, there is consensus that CIs include
government, society’s ICT (information and
communication technology); financial sector; energy
supply; water supply; transportation systems; health
sector; and security services (police, military).
CIs are exposed to natural hazards and man-made
hazards (human errors, human malignity). Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) embodies the
management of risk assessment, risk mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery against serious
incidents threatening the critical infrastructure of a
region or nation.
CIs are highly interconnected and, hence,
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interdependent: a disruption diminishing the capacity
of a CI affects other CIs through cascading effects
(propagation of the disruption to other CIs that need
services from the disrupted CI).
Society depends increasingly on the wellfunctioning of its information and communication
infrastructure. For example, a vulnerability analysis
[9] conducted by the Norwegian Directorate for Civil
Protection (DSB) concluded that a cyber-attack
causing complete disruption of the ICT CI’s transport
network in Norway would have:
• high impact on security CI;
• high impact on financial CI;
• high impact on railways and airline traffic,
and moderate impact on other transport CIs;
• low impact on water CI;
• low impact on energy CI; but then secondary
cascading effects from minor disruptions on
energy infrastructure would increase
significantly the disruption of ICT CI;
• moderate impact on health CI.
The aggregate impact of such a cyber-attack on
ICT CI in Norway would be considerable in terms of
financial costs (around one billion euro, or 1.2 billion
US dollars, which is about 3.5 per cent of Norway’s
gross national product). The estimate is probably
conservative, since the analysis in the report concludes
that the ICT CI will not recover completely for about
one month. The event may cause social and political
instability in addition, with unpredictable long-term
consequences.
The dynamics of interconnected CIs are extremely
complex. There are numerous approaches for
modelling cascading effects; a recent extensive review
[10] enumerates six modelling categories, viz.
empirical approaches, agent-based approaches, system
dynamics-based approaches, economic theory based
approaches, network based approaches, and others.
The author concludes that none of the existing
approaches is completely satisfactory: key challenges
are difficulties of data access and collection, or lack of
precise data; lack of integration of different modelling
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approaches, yielding conflicting outcomes; validation
problems owing to insufficient or unreliable historical
data, and lack of standards for relevant metrics.
Furthermore, most models’ predictions rarely can
be validated by comparison with real data; few models
of interconnected CIs correspond fully to observed
scenarios [10].
Rather than focusing on detailed models with a
high number of variables and relations between them,
we argue that highly aggregated models, with simple
model structure, have several advantages. They are
simple to understand, they concentrate on a few
essential factors and they request only few parameters
with down-to-earth relations among them. The
estimate of such relations admittedly relies on expert
opinion. But the attractiveness of a simple and easy to
understand model, and the fact that only few
parameters need to be estimated, facilitate a focused
discussion and a potentially more reliable estimate in
a Delphi [8] or a wisdom of the crowd approach [12]
in conjunction with model iterations.
Such a simulation model would allow to analyse
the impacts of cascading effects. Specifically, it would
allow checking the robustness of a CI system towards
series of disruptions, whether arising by chance or
planned by a malignant agent, if they are timed and
targeted at the weakest links, arising dynamically, as
the cascading effects propagate.
An interesting high-level system dynamics
modelling approach for interconnected CIs has been
recently proposed by Canzani [2]. Canzani considers a
system of systems consisting of any number of
interdependent CIs for the objective to analyse the
performance level of the CIs when disruptions caused
by natural or man-made disasters happen.
In Canzani’s model, each CI is represented as a
structure of three stocks, viz. ‘Running operations’,
‘Down operations’ and ‘Recovered operations’,
describing three possible states for a given CI. The
stock ‘Running operations’ represents the number of
active operations in a given CI. The stock ‘Down
operations’ represents the number of not running
operations, owing to a disruption; such disruption
could have been caused directly by a natural or a manmade event. The stock ‘Recovering operations’
represents a state of transition to ‘Running operations’,
counted as the number of running operations and – but
for some unexplained reason – not being susceptible
to disruptions.
Interesting as it is, Canzani’s approach suffers
from three major deficiencies.
First, Canzani’s model is structured as an epidemic
model known as SIRS, where S refers to a stock of
susceptible, I to a stock of infected and R to a stock of
recovering individuals. Canzani argues that the stock

“Running operations” is analogous to a stock of
susceptible individuals; that the stock of “Down
operations” is analogous to a stock of infected
individuals; and, finally, that the stock of “Recovering
operations” is analogous to a stock of individuals
recovering from infection.
To deserve its name, an epidemic model must
include infections transmitted through contacts
between the I and the S state. However, there is no
such “infection” from “Down operations” to “Running
operations” in Canzani’s model – nor can it be. The
process causing running operations to cease operating
is not an internal transmission of kind of “infections”
affecting the state of “Down operations” to the state of
“Running operations”. Rather, the process causing
running operations to cease operating is an external
disruption: either a direct disruption to the particular
CI or indirect disruptions in terms of reduced service
from other disrupted CIs through cascading effects.
As a corollary, since Canzani’s model does not
describe a process analogous to the spread of an
epidemic, the stock of “Recovering operations” –
which logically would be a state “immune” to
disruptions – does not make sense.
Second, Canzani’s unit of measure for CI
operations is the number of operations in each of the
states. This unit of measure, we believe, has been
proposed in analogy to the stocks in a SIRS model,
where the unit of measure is the number of individuals
in the corresponding state (e.g., the number of
susceptible, the number of infected and the number of
recovering individuals). The proposed unit of measure
for CIs – the number of operations in each of the states
– is an artificial construct with hardly a
correspondence in practice.
Third and last, but not least, Canzani’s system
dynamics model has not been subjected to tests to
create confidence on the model’s verifiability and
validity [5, see Ch. 21 “Truth and Beauty: Validation
and Model Testing”, pp. 845-892].

2. Theory
Canzani proposes an elegant representation of the
dependence of a CIj on another CIk in terms of the
service provided by CIk to CIj and the effect of a
disruption of CIk on CIj. The indices j and k refer to
the CIs in the system of systems to be modelled; e.g.,
the index value 1 could represent ICT CI; index 2,
could stand for Energy CI; etc. Estimates for the effect
of a disruption of CIk on CIj have been provided in the
Ph.D. thesis of Ana Laugé [6], see §3.
The service provided by a given CI labelled with
the index i, is given by:
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𝑆 𝑖 (𝑡)
𝑖
𝑂𝑃𝑖 𝑟𝑢𝑛 (𝑡) ≥ 𝐷𝐴𝑣

1,

1
= {𝑂𝑃𝑖 𝑟𝑢𝑛 (𝑡)
,
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑖
𝐷𝐴𝑣
where 𝑂𝑃𝑖 𝑟𝑢𝑛 (𝑡) represents the CI’s current running
𝑖
operations fraction of its maximum capability, and 𝐷𝐴𝑣
𝑖 (𝑡)
is its average demand. The function 𝑆
is used to
generate a relative value between 0 and 1.
Because the breakdown rate 𝛼 𝑖 (𝑡) is affected by
this function, the interdependencies of the CI are
modelled as a formula:
𝑒𝑖𝑗 ∙ (1 − 𝑆𝑗 (𝑡))
2
𝛼 𝑖 (𝑡) = ∑
|𝐽|
𝑗 ∈𝐽

The cardinality (sum of all elements in a set) of 𝐽
represents the set of all the CIs considered. 𝑒𝑖𝑗 is a
matrix element representing the effect CIj on CIi based
on the Ph.D. thesis of Ana Laugé.

3. Estimating CI dependencies on other
CIs
Laugé conducted a survey with CI managers to
obtain estimates on a Likert scale for such cascading
impacts caused by a disruption of less than two hours,
less than six hours, less than 12 hours, less than 24
hours, more than 24 hours and more than one week;
she computed averages of the provided estimates
resulting in tables for each of the cases [2, pp.169–
182].
The survey was formed as online questionnaires
with the aim of analysing the CI interdependencies of
11 CIs mentioned by [3], namely: Energy, ICT, Water,
Food, Health, Financial, Public and legal order and
safety, Civil administration, Transport, Chemical and
nuclear industry, and Space and research. The survey
was developed and executed in five concise steps,
including a trial run, which ensured that the questions
were well written and understandable for the
participating experts.
The survey was divided into three sections, where
the first section is related to the experts taking the
survey and they were asked to select which of the 11
CIs they were the stewards of. Although the survey
was sent to several experts around the world, the
organizations the participating experts belonged to
were predominantly Spanish. The second section is
concerned with the measurement of interdependencies
and the time required to recover their CI after the
interdependent CI have recovered. The answers led to
the conclusion that there is no standard recovery time,
due to different equipment and procedures.
Subsequently from this the average time to restore any

of the 11 CI operations after a disruption, is undefined.
The last section asked the experts to assess the effect a
complete breakdown of a networked CI had on their
CI. The aim with this section was to know the
magnitude of the effects, ranging from “0 – no effect”,
to “5 – very high effect”. This was concerning a direct
dependency from one CI to another and the
corresponding table values were calculated by using
the average of the responses.

4. System dynamics model
System Dynamics (SD) is a methodology to build
simulation models using computers, to study the
behaviour of systems [4, 11]. It is an application of
Servomechanism or Information Feedback Systems
Theory [11] to almost all kinds of social systems. SD
is an abstraction of the reality into a system of
simultaneous non-linear first order differential
equations. These equations should be solved –usually
numerically– to reproduce the over-time behaviour of
the system, under investigation. Our proposed SD
model is a simple model that is an upgrade from
Canzani’s model [2]. We have introduced several
changes that enhanced her model like the CIs included,
and basically addressed the three major deficiencies
that model suffered from. In the following subsections
we will go through the structure of our SD model
highlighting the changes we have made, in addition to
presenting the model validation and testing results.

4.1. CI System Dynamics Model Structure
In our model, a CI depends on merely two stocks
Running Operations” and “CI Down
Operations” instead of Canzani’s three stocks. For
any CI included in our model, the “CI Running
Operations” stock initially contains all its correctly
functioning operations divided by its maximum
capability. When a failure happens to the CI, these
operations (fraction of the CI’s maximum capability)
will be moved via the “CI Breakdown” rate to the “CI
Down Operations” stock. After being recovered,
these operations return to work by being moved back
to “CI Running Operations” via “CI Return to
Service” rate. Figure 1 shows our model’s CI
structure.
Only five CIs were included in Canzani’s model,
namely: Energy, ICT, Health, Financial, and
Transport. To have a more comprehensive picture of
the effect of a failed CI on other CIs, we have used the
same CI structure for the 11 CIs included in Laugé
surveys mentioned before. We have utilized the
Vensim DSS subscript capability to index the same
“CI
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structure for these 11 CIs.

where:
Notation
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑆[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐶𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]

CI Average Repair
and Restore Time

CI Return to Service
CI Running
Operations

CI Down
Operations
CI Breakdown

CI Service Provided
CI Average Demand

<CI Disruption>

Fastest Draining <Effect of CIj
Time
Failure on CIi>

Figure 1: CI System Dynamics Structure

Mathematically, the value of the “CI Running
Operations” stock is the integration of the “CI Return
to Service” rate minus the “CI Breakdown” rate.
Whereas the “CI Down Operations” stock is the
integration of the “CI Breakdown” rate minus the “CI
Return to Service” rate. The “CI Breakdown” rate
behaves according to the following equation:
𝐶𝐼𝐵[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ] = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {

𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
,
𝐹𝐷𝑇

𝐶𝐼𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ] + 𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
∙ ∑ (𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑗[𝐶𝐼𝑖 , 𝐶𝐼𝑗 ]
𝑗 ∈𝐽

∙

1 − 𝐶𝐼𝑆𝑃[𝐶𝐼𝑗 ]
)}
|𝐽|

where:
Notation
𝐶𝐼𝐵[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐹𝐷𝑇
𝐶𝐼𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑗[𝐶𝐼𝑖 , 𝐶𝐼𝑗 ]

𝐶𝐼𝑆𝑃[𝐶𝐼𝑗 ]

Meaning/Name in the figure
𝐶𝐼 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].
𝐶𝐼𝑖 represents any of the CIs
included in our model.
𝐶𝐼 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].
𝐹𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒.
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐼𝑗 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝐼𝑖
[𝐶𝐼𝑖 , 𝐶𝐼𝑗 ], which is equivalent to
𝑒𝑖𝑗 from equation 2.
𝐶𝐼𝑗 represents all failed CIs
affecting 𝐶𝐼𝑖 , which are the
elements of 𝐽.
𝐶𝐼 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑[𝐶𝐼𝑗 ],
which is equivalent to 𝑆 𝑗 (𝑡) in
equation 2.

The minimum function and its first term included
in the equation of the “CI Breakdown” rate are used
to prevent the rate from draining the “CI Running
Operations” stock below zero.
The “CI Return to Service” rate is defined as:
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑆[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ] =
𝐶𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]

Meaning/In the figure
𝐶𝐼 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].
𝐶𝐼 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].

This rate equation will move all operations inside
the “CI Down Operations” stock back to the “CI
Running Operations” stock over an average period
equal to “CI Average Repair and Restore Time”,
which is the average total time needed to restore and
repair the failed operations as the name implies. This
value replaces both two separate values for the total
average repair time and the total average restore time
in Canzani’s model. Canzani indicated that these
values are not the focus of her work and, apparently,
they were arbitrarily chosen. Accordingly, for
demonstration purposes, we have arbitrarily chosen 72
hours for this time constant.
In Figure 1, the “CI Service Provided” represents
𝑆 𝑖 (𝑡) of equation 1. In the model, this variable is
defined as follows:
𝐶𝐼𝑆𝑃[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
1,
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ] ≥ 𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
]
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼
={
𝑖
,
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
where:
Notation
𝐶𝐼𝑆𝑃[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑂[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]

Meaning/Name in the figure
𝐶𝐼 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].
𝐶𝐼 𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].
𝐶𝐼 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].

In our model, for demonstration purposes, the “CI
Average Demand” was arbitrarily assumed to be 95%
of the CI’s full capacity required to supply the demand
of its dependent CIs.

4.2. Effect on CIi from CIj
In her model, Canzani used Laugé’s table of CI
dependencies when other CIs fail for less than two
hours only. Nevertheless, these dependencies are not
static as such; as previously mentioned, Laugé’s thesis
presented different tables for different disruption time
durations. Accordingly, to include such dynamics in
our model, we have rearranged the values of Laugé’s
dependencies tables (see Figure 2) in separate timebased table functions [11, Ch. 14, p. 551-595]. (Figure
3 shows the time-based table function of the effect of
the ICT CI failure on the Energy CI as an example.)
These SD time-based graph functions provide a
dynamic time-dependent values of the 𝑒𝑖𝑗 of equation
2, or of the 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐼𝑗 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝐼𝑖 [𝐶𝐼𝑖 , 𝐶𝐼𝑗 ] in
our SD model.
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Figure 3: Effect of CI ICT Failure on CI Energy
over Time

Figure 2: CI Dependencies when other CIs Fail for Different Durations

4.3. CI Disruption SD Structure
CI Disruption structure, as the name implies,
emulates a disruption happening to any of the CIs
included in our model. Based on a pulse function
𝑡−𝑡
Π ( 𝑑) where 𝑡, 𝑡𝑑 , and Δ𝑇 represent time, the
Δ𝑇
disruption time, and the disruption duration
respectively [13], the following equation –which is
used by Canzani [2] as well– presents the disruption in
CIi:
𝑡 − 𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑇[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐶𝐼𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ] = 𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑀[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ] ∙ Π (
)
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
where:
Notation
𝐶𝐼𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑀[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑇[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐷[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]

Meaning/Name in the figure
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ].

Because our model has replaced the static 𝑒𝑖𝑗 with
a time-based graph function, in addition to the model
simulation time-line, a coexistent simulation time-line
that starts with the onset of any disruption is needed.
This newly generated time-line will work as an input
to the graph function to generate the correct timebased 𝑒𝑖𝑗 value replacement. In our model, this new
time-line is generated inside the model variable
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ] (shown in Figure
4). Yet, to calculate this variable, the model needs to

identify the onset of any disruption. To do so, the
model benefits from the Vensim DSS “SAMPLE IF
TRUE” function. This function returns its input when
certain condition is met, and remains constant
otherwise [14].
The condition that triggers this function in our
model is the beginning of a disruption, which is
identified via subtracting the one time-step delayed
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 [𝐶𝐼𝑖 ] from itself. As such, the
“SAMPLE IF TRUE” function is used inside
𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ] (shown
in Figure 4) to sample the value of the simulation time
when the disruption starts. This sampled time value
from the simulation time (done inside the model
variable 𝐶𝐼 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟[𝐶𝐼𝑖 ]) as long
as the disruption continues. Figure 4 shows the whole
CI disruption SD structure. Figure 5 shows the original
and one generated simulation time-lines of which
disruption starts at hour 48 and ends 24 hours later.
Effect of CIj
Failure on CIi

CI Disruption
Magnitude
CI Disruption
Duration

CI Disruption Time
Counter

CI Disruption Time

CI Disruption

Effect of CIj Failure
on CIi Data
<Time>

CI Disruption Time
Counter Trigger
<TIME STEP>

Delayed CI
Disruption

Figure 4: CI Disruption SD Structure
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4.4. Model Testing and Validation
SD model testing and validation increase
customers trust in the model, in addition to detecting
any problems in that model [11]. We have used what
is applicable from the set of tests introduced by [5] and
recommended by [11] to test and validate our model.
Boundary adequacy test [5, 1, 11] is concerned with
answering whether “the important concepts for
addressing the [studied] problem [are] endogenous to
the model” [11]. While structure assessment [1, 11] is
concerned with answering whether the model structure
is “consistent with relevant descriptive knowledge of
the system” and whether the level of aggregation is
appropriate. Our model inherited the same boundaries
and basic structure of Canzani’s, which, although a
simple model, includes all necessary components to
study a CI disruption effect at this level aggregation.
Moreover, removing the third stock of Canzani’s
model presented a change to the structure that aims at
making the model more consistent with the real
system. Accordingly, the structure and aggregation
level were found to be relevant and appropriate for the
model purpose.
Dimensional consistency test [5, 1, 11] checks
whether all equation of the model are dimensionally
consistent, maintaining that the parameters should
have real system equivalent [11]. Using the unit check
feature of Vensim DSS [15] assured the model
dimensional consistency.
Parameter assessment [5, 1, 11] is associated with
answering whether the values of the model parameter
are consistent with relevant descriptive and numerical
knowledge of the system, and whether the parameters
have real system equivalents [11]. Aside from the few
arbitrarily chosen values clearly indicated before, all
other parameters used in the model were retrieved
from Laugé’s survey.
Furthermore, the model robustness has been tested
under extreme conditions [5, 1, 11]. Testing extreme
conditions is concerned with answering whether “each
equation make[s] sense even when its inputs take on

extreme values”, and whether “the model respond
plausibly when subjected to extreme policies, shocks,
and parameters” [11]. Accordingly, we have utilized
the “automatically simulate a model on changes”
functionality of Vensim SyntheSim mode to test the
consequences of changing model variables and
parameters to extreme values. The usual consequence
of changing a variable’s value to zero, as an extreme
value for example, is several dependent equations
failing because of division by zero. However, in other
cases the consequence could be implausible
behaviour. In all cases, multiple iterations of fixing the
equations were conducted until reaching plausible
behaviour.
Moreover, the model was tested for integration
error, which aims at checking whether “the results are
sensitive to the choice of time step or numerical
integration method” [11]. Different time step values
and different numerical integration methods were
tested. The combination of Euler method and time step
of 0.125 was found suitable, as by decreasing the time
step value and using different integration methods, the
behaviour of model was found to be insensitive to such
changes. In the same time, the time step was not very
small rendering the numerical integration process
slow. Behaviours of different variables were also
compared under different time step, and no difference
was noticed.
Moreover, sensitivity analysis [5, 11], which is
concerned with testing the robustness of the model
under assumed uncertainties in parameters and initial
values, was applied to the model using Vensim DSS.
To test model sensitivity, Vensim DSS uses MonteCarlo simulations [13]. We have run 200 Monte-Carlo
simulations per parameter. As no further information
about the probability distribution of the parameters
was available, we opted for Uniform probability
distribution for all parameters. We did not have any
benchmark for the numerical changes in the model
variables due to the change in any of the tested
parameters to test our results against. However, in all
sensitivity tests we have conducted, we have not
spotted any change in the modes of behaviour,
consequently no policy implications change due to the
change in the values of the parameters. Accordingly,
we find the results acceptable.

5. Simulation
In this section we describe several simulations of
small cyber-attacks in different conditions to fully
understand the limits of the effect of such disruptions.
In agreement with Canzani, we have assumed that a
small disruption will have a magnitude equal to two.
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This scenario simulates a single small attack
disruption aimed at the ICT CI which happens two
days after the beginning of the simulation, and stays
active for one day. We have borrowed this scenario
from Canzani’s research [2] to show the effect of such
a small cyber-attack for comparison purposes with
other cyber-attack forms.
Figure 6 shows the results of this scenario on two
different charts, one showing the effect of the cyberattack on the running operations 𝑂𝑃𝑖 𝑟𝑢𝑛 (𝑡) of all 11
CIs, while the other shows the effect on the service
provided 𝑆 𝑖 (𝑡) by these CIs. This single small cyberattack causes 41% drop in the running operations of
the ICT CI in the third day of the simulation. The ICT
CI could not regain 99% of its running operations until
the 13th day. Nonetheless, the cascaded negative effect
on other CIs’ running operations did not exceed 3.1%
at its highest. In terms of service provided, merely the
ICT CI was affected negatively with a 38% drop of its
value, i.e. the attack could not be cascaded to services
provided by other CIs.
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stayed active for a duration of one day, and there was
one day off in-between every two attacks.
Figure 7 shows a large negative effect on the
running operations of the ICT CI with a 73% drop at
its highest in the seventh day. The ICT CI could not
regain 99% of its running operations before the 17 th
day. The effect was cascaded to other CIs’ running
operations and reached around 5% drop in the case of
Water, Civil administration, and Space and research
CIs. The drop reached around 10% for all other CIs,
reaching 10.1% drop at its highest in the case of
Chemical and nuclear industry CI.
In terms of service provided, the drop in the ICT
CI service provided exceeded 71%. This negative
effect was not cascaded to Water, Civil administration,
and Space and research CIs at all. However, the
negative effect was cascaded to the service provided
by all other CIs with 5% drop at its highest in the case
of Public and legal order and safety, and Chemical and
nuclear industry CIs.
CI Running Operations
(Dimensionless)

5.1. Scenario 1 – a single small cyber-attack
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Figure 6: A Single Small Cyber-attack

5.2. Scenario 2 – three successive small cyberattacks
This scenario simulates three successive small
attacks aimed at the ICT CI which happen two days
after the beginning of the simulation time. Each attack

Figure 7: Three Successive Small Cyber-attacks

5.3. Scenario 3 – a single small cyber-attack
followed by an energy failure
This scenario simulates a single small attack
disruption aimed at the ICT CI which happens 2 days
after the beginning of the simulation, and stays active
for one day. This cyber-attack is followed by an
Energy CI disruption that has a magnitude of eight,
starts four days from the simulation time, and stays
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CI Running Operations
(Dimensionless)

active for a duration of one and a half days.
Figure 8 shows the results of this scenario. Similar
to Scenario – 1, the attack on the ICT CI dropped its
running operations by 41% in the third day of the
simulation. As known from Scenario – 1, the
cascading negative effect on other CIs is very limited.
The disruption that happened in the Energy CI caused
the CI to completely stop working at the fifth day for
12 hours.
The effect of both disruptions was cascaded to
other CIs’ running operations and reached an average
drop of 7% in Water, Civil administration, and Space
and research CIs, and an average drop of 14% in all
other CIs, reaching 18.6% drop at its highest in the
case of Chemical and nuclear industry CI.
100
80
60
40
20
0
0

168

336

504

672

CI Running Operations
(Dimensionless)

CI Service Provided
(Dimensionless)

1

disruption that happened in the Energy CI by the
beginning of the simulation caused the CI to
completely stop working after one day for 12 hours.
Moreover, similar to Scenario – 3, the cyber-attack
causes a large negative effect on the running
operations of the ICT CI that exceeded 76% drop at its
highest in the seventh day (compared to 73% in
Scenario – 3).
The negative effect of both disruptions was
cascaded to other CIs’ running operations and reached
around 8% drop in Water, Civil administration, and
Space and research CIs, and around 16% drop for all
other CIs, reaching 20% drop at its highest in the case
of Chemical and nuclear industry CI.
In terms of service provided, there were a total
drop in the Energy CI, and another drop in the ICT CI
service provided which exceeded 74%. The negative
effect was cascaded to the services provided by Water,
Civil administration, and Space and research CIs with
an average drop of 4%. Moreover, the negative effect
was cascaded to the service provided by all other CIs
with on average drop of 12%; and at its highest in the
case of Chemical and nuclear industry CI with 15.8%
drop.
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Figure 8: A Single Small Cyber-attack Followed by an
Energy Failure

5.4. Scenario 4 – three successive small cyberattacks following an energy failure
This scenario simulates an Energy CI disruption
that has a magnitude of eight, starts at the beginning of
the simulation, and keeps on for a duration of one and
half days. This disruption is followed by three
successive small attacks aimed at the ICT CI which
happen two days after the beginning of the simulation,
and having one day in-between every two attacks.
Each attack stays active for durations of one day as
well.
Figure 9 shows the results of this scenario. The
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Figure 9: Three Successive Small Cyber-attacks Following
an Energy Failure

5.5. Scenario 5 – three successive small cyberattacks followed by an energy failure
This scenario simulates three successive small
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CI Running Operations
(Dimensionless)

attacks aimed at the ICT CI which happen two days
after the simulation, and having one day in-between
every two attack. Each attack stays active for durations
of one day. These cyber-attacks are followed by an
Energy CI disruption that has a magnitude of eight,
starts eight days from the simulation time, and keeps
on for a duration of one and a half days.
Figure 10, similar to Scenario – 3, shows a large
negative effect on the running operations of the ICT
CI with a 73% drop at its highest in the seventh day.
The disruption happened in the Energy CI caused the
CI to completely stop working at the ninth day for 12
hours. Clearly from the figure, this caused the ICT CI
to require three more days to go back to 99% of its
running operations compared to Scenario – 2 (not
before the 20th day of the simulation).
The negative effect of both disruptions was
cascaded to other CIs’ running operations and reached
around 10% drop in Water, Civil administration, and
Space and research CIs, and around 18% drop for all
other CIs, reaching 22.4% drop at its highest in the
case of Chemical and nuclear industry CI.
In terms of service provided, the drop in the ICT
CI service provided exceeded 71%. This negative
effect was cascaded to the services provided by Water,
Civil administration, and Space and research CIs with
an average drop of 5%. The negative effect was
cascaded to the service provided by all other CIs with
an average drop of 13%; at its highest in the case of
Chemical and nuclear industry CIs with 18% drop.
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Figure 10: Three Successive Small Cyber-attacks Followed
by an Energy Failure

5.6. Scenarios summary
Table 1 summarizes the results of all tested
scenarios from 1 to 5. In the table, the scenarios are
referred to by their corresponding number.
Table 1: Scenarios Summary

#

Number
of
cyberattacks

Energy
disruption

Highest
drop in
other CIs’
running
operations

1
2
3
4
5

1
3
1
3
3

Yes
Yes
Yes

3.1 %
10.1 %
18.6 %
20.0 %
22.4 %

Highest
drop in
other
CIs’
service
provided
0.0 %
5.4 %
14.3 %
15.8 %
18.3 %

While scenario 5 causes about 10 percent higher
drops in CI operations, comparing Fig. 9 with 10, it is
quite evident that the cyber attacks following the
energy outage also prolong the duration of the outage
and of the disruptions in other CIs.

6. Concluding remarks
The approach presented in this paper combines the
simplicity of disruption dynamics of interconnected
Critical Infrastructures with a matrix 𝑒𝑖𝑗 encapsulating
the complexities of the cascading effect from
disruption originating in CIj upon CIi, where the
indices i and j are labels for the Critical Infrastructures
of interest. We have proceeded on the assumption that
the approach pioneered by Laugé [6] and Laugé et al.
[7], i.e. that the expert assessment of 𝑒𝑖𝑗 can render a
sufficiently accurate metrics of the cascading effects,
is viable. By “viable” we mean that a door has been
opened for iteratively assessing such expert
assessment with simulation results.
Then, we wanted to investigate whether malicious
agents could design effective attacks on Critical
Infrastructures without needing to plan for one major
disruption. To this effect we relied on the expert
assessments of 𝑒𝑖𝑗 obtained by Laugé and simulated
various scenarios. The combination of a major energy
failure followed by three “opportunistic” small cyberattacks did indeed show major cascading effects.
Massive energy failures happen occasionally; malicious
attackers can sit on the fence and release of-the-shelf
cyber-attacks when such failure happens. Slightly larger
service drops, albeit of shorter duration occurred if the
energy failure followed after a series of small cyberattacks. Such scenario is not unrealistic, since energy
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failures occur more and more often as consequences of
predictable extreme weather.
It is indeed a weakness that no empirical estimates
of the restore times are available. Not having such
estimates, we do not emphasize the quantitative
consequences but rather stick to the qualitative
consequences (patterns of disruption).
An open question is whether Laugé’s estimates of
CI dependencies [6, 7] have general validity. In
Laugé’s study, the organizations the participating
experts belonged to were predominantly Spanish. To
what extent this “Spanish” data is valid for other
countries has not been investigated: it would require.
duplicating Laugé’s study in other countries. On the
other hand, critical infrastructures are reasonable
similar across countries; hence, one would expect
similar interdependencies in different countries rather
than very different ones.
A note of caution: the fact that the aggregated CI
dependencies provided in [6, 7] are disruptive does not
mean that organizational and behavioural effects are
excluded in the experts’ estimates. It is a weakness that
the estimates are “static”, in the sense of referring to
the status quo. Hence, at the time being we lack data
to enhance the model to explore different policies to
mitigate the impact of disruptions.
Finally, we wonder whether we should rejoice if
the path sketched in this paper does lead to simple but
accurate enough description of attack scenarios on
Critical Infrastructures. A door would open for using
simple tools to plan serious CI attacks.
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